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Swords or Shields?

Implementing and subverting the Final Solution in Nazi-occupied Europe

“If I could not be your sword, at least I would be your shield.”
— Gen. Henri-Philippe Pétain, during his trial for war crimes as head of the Vichy Government

Though historians have made immeasurable contributions to our understanding of the Holocaust, political scientists have been reluctant to join the debate. This is unfortunate, because political analysis has made great strides in our understanding of state-sponsored violence, ethnic conflict, and warfare — all of which have direct relevance for our understanding of the Holocaust.

In this project, I add a historically-sensitive contribution to our understanding of various political aspects of the Holocaust. I do so by looking at how occupied countries responded to German demands during World War Two, especially those demands pertaining to the Final Solution. Scholars have long observed that the implementation of antisemitic policy depended largely on the attitude of the local population: Non-Jewish Danes participated in massive acts of passive and active resistance, thereby saving most of Denmark’s Jewish population, while Romanians took to the Final Solution with such zeal that German military officers actually had to restrain locals from committing sheer butchery in the city streets. But it is far from clear how these differing responses actually translated into the proportion of the Jewish population decimated in each occupied country.

Intuitively, one would expect higher rates of Jewish victimization in countries characterized by high degrees of antisemitism. However, this is not at all the case. In fact, Jews often fared best in countries that were otherwise amenable to Nazi policies, even when those countries were openly antisemitic. For example, despite public hostility to Jews in Romania, the government in that country actually succeeded in protecting nearly 50% of Romania’s Jews from certain destruction. Contrast this with the experience of Jews in the Netherlands, where a Western-oriented government with no significant antisemitism and a long tradition of democracy and religious tolerance saw nearly three-quarters of its Jewish population deported and killed. The

Jews of Vichy France fared relatively well, despite the fact that this regime is notorious for being among Nazi Germany's most faithful collaborators. Meanwhile, despite the valiant and even legendary resistance of many Serbs to German authority, Serbia itself was the first occupied country in all of Europe to be declared *judenrein*, free of Jews. Most ironic of all, Italy and Finland — fellow Axis powers and Germany's closest allies — were also two of the safest countries in Europe from the Jewish point of view. Clearly, there is very little significant correlation between domestic antisemitism and degree of victimization.

If antisemitism was not the main determinant of Jewish victimization rates in Nazi-occupied Europe, what was? I show that the 'success' of the German genocide program depended most importantly upon the relationship between Germany and each occupied country. Like any imperial power, Germany faced a choice as to how it was to administer countries in its sphere of influence. In some cases (like Poland and the Netherlands), Germany occupied and ruled the territory directly. In others (Vichy France, Denmark), Germany exercised its authority by exerting pressure on high-ranking, domestic governing officials (collaborators). I argue that where German rule was direct, its implementation of the Final Solution was unhindered, and therefore more effective. On the other hand, where Germany ruled through collaborators, the precise implementation of genocidal policies was the result of complex bargaining and negotiations: In return for their loyal cooperation in military or economic policy, collaborators could often get away with partial or simply 'unenthusiastic' implementation of the Final Solution. This was often a major factor in reducing rates of Jewish victimization.

As part of this project, I investigate the incentives that existed for collaborationist regimes to negotiate on behalf of local Jews — as well as the German incentives to accept their terms. With regard to the latter, Nazi Germany clearly found indirect rule to be beneficial in a number of respects. Usually, what Germany lost in terms of inefficiency and compromise, it gained in terms of lower governance costs. Thus, so long as collaborationist regimes could be trusted not to sabotage the German war effort, Germany was willing to let its 'Quislings' take on the responsibilities of fighting partisans or enforcing local law. Indeed, with locals at the helm, German administration of an occupied territory retained at least the pretense of domestic legitimacy, something that was nearly impossible where Germany ruled directly.

Of course, collaborators could also benefit from their relationship with Nazi Germany. Aside from the obvious fact that their positions in office were sometimes bolstered by German sponsorship, occupied countries could often reap the economic rewards of trade with the Third Reich. In the meantime, military cooperation with Germany often held out the promise of territorial

expansion at the expense of one's neighbors — as it did for Finland and Romania in Russia, and Bulgaria in Yugoslavia and Greece. Lured by the economic, military, and political rewards of cooperation, and responding to their own domestic concerns, collaborators often had the incentive to strike deals with German occupying officials, deals which had the (sometimes unintentional) result of protecting local Jewish populations.

But why would collaborators use the autonomy that resulted from cooperation to *protect* local Jews? Certainly, genuine concern for the well-being of Jewish citizens, or reflection upon the sheer horror of the Nazi program, was sometimes a relevant factor. But for the most part, collaborators only consistently protected local Jews when it was in their best interest to do so, narrowly defined. Sometimes, they did so because Jews were part of key political constituencies. And sometimes, Jews even bribed local officials for protection from Nazi persecution. In applying political analysis to the Holocaust, I evaluate the importance of material and strategic factors in the implementation of Nazi policy. I hypothesize that these factors played at least as decisive a role as antisemitism in the implementation of the Final Solution. In so arguing, I am not saying that antisemitism was unrelated to victimization-rate variation. Rather, I am broadening the debate so as to include factors that many previous studies have overlooked.

Likewise, this project demonstrates the importance of political science as a contributing discipline to the study of the Holocaust. Though many Holocaust scholars and historians have considered the implementation of the Final Solution in this or that particular country, there are few broadly comparative studies of the Nazi genocide, and none that provides such systematic analysis of the incentives facing the main actors in this historical event. Likewise, political science is uniquely suited to examining the role of the state as a relevant actor in the perpetration of the Holocaust. Though many scholars of the Holocaust have rightly directed our attention to the importance of societal factors and non-state institutions in the implementation of the Final Solution, there can be no denial that the state, too, is an important unit of analysis. This project does not contest the importance of societal-level analyses of the Holocaust, but rather contributes to the discourse a state-based, political understanding of it. Thus, it both develops from and contributes to existing perspectives on the implementation of the Final Solution in German-occupied Europe.

What others have said.

In the vast literature on the Holocaust, there are surprisingly few attempts to explain comparative rates of victimization in rigorous or generalizable terms. In those works that *are* explicitly comparative, cultural and ideological factors (of which antisemitism is one) often take on important

explanatory roles. However, as we have seen, there is little evidence that domestic antisemitism was an important determinant of Jewish victimization.

Though many scholars are hesitant to explicitly suggest explanatory variables for differing victimization rates*, a few possible factors become apparent in a review of their findings. Geography, the timing of deportations, local attitudes and demographics, and even the precise make up of the German occupational bureaucracy have all been proposed as explanations for Jewish victimization. But while each of these factors clearly has an effect, none is sufficient to explain outcomes across a wide variety of cases.†

Only two scholars have devoted explicit attention to a general explanation for victimization rate variation. In “The Strength of Perpetrators – The Holocaust in Western Europe, 1940-1944,”‡ Wolfgang Seibel explains comparative Jewish victimization in France, Belgium and the Netherlands with regard to the nature of the German occupational bureaucracy and territorial fragmentation of the occupied country. Meanwhile, Helen Fein’s *Accounting for Genocide* argues that the “extent of Jewish victimization” varied primarily with regard to the level of prewar antisemitism, and increased sharply “as a function of the intensity of the SS grip over the state in 1941.”§ While Fein and Seibel provide a powerful foundation for future study of this issue (my own included), their brevity on the issue of collaboration itself leaves out a crucial part of the equation. I intend to build upon the foundation provided by their important scholarship.

My investigation takes over precisely where that of Fein and Seibel leaves off. With explicit consideration of German military and economic strategy, I provide a rigorous framework for understanding the degree of German authority in each occupied country. Additionally, with explicit consideration of the political dynamics and incentive structures within collaborationist regimes, I can explain why local officials (even those in relatively antisemitic countries) sometimes used their power to stymie German social policy, including its implementation of the Final Solution.

* In their broadly comparative analysis of the implementation of the Final Solution in Western Europe, Marrus and Paxton conclude that “Generalizations break apart on the stubborn particularity” of each case [196]. Bela Vago echoes that sentiment in his complementary assessment of Eastern Europe, arguing that “generalization ... entail[s] the risk of simplification and misrepresentation” [233]. [Both articles found in François Furet’s (ed) *Unanswered Questions: Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the Jews* (New York: Schocken Books, 1989).] My hypothesis is that such caution is unwarranted, and that we *can* make certain, limited generalizations regarding victimization rate — even across such a wide variety of cases.

† For example, I have conducted a statistical test which compares the timing of deportations with victimization rates across the German area of influence. While there is a weak relationship between these factors, it is not statistically significant.

‡ As found in *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* (15:2) April 2002: pp. 211-240.

§ (New York: The Free Press, 1979): p. 82.

Victimization rates in German-occupied Europe.

The following table indicates the Jewish victimization rate for all countries in the German sphere of influence during World War II. Note that, since this is a study of policy implementation and efficiency, **victimization rate** has been defined as the percentage of Jews deported *and/or* killed from a given territory.* Insofar as statistics are available, pre-Final Solution Jewish population figures are given according to national borders and the number of Jews remaining at the time the policy was first implemented. I have also used the most inclusive definition of Jews for the pre-Final Solution population statistics, since legal maneuvers to reduce the number of would-be victims by defining 'Jew' more narrowly were common among countries determined to protect their most assimilated Jewish populations. Given these considerations, the statistics presented here may differ somewhat from other figures in the existing literature.†

* Thus, Jewish people who survived the ordeals of deportation and imprisonment ('victimized survivors') are still considered victims, as are those ('undeported victims') who were killed in their countries of origin.

† For a more thorough discussion of how I arrived at these victimization statistics, see the case study chapters of *Swords or Shields? Implementing and Subverting the Final Solution in German-occupied Europe*, my Ph.D. thesis (University of California, San Diego, 2006). Due to rounding, estimation, and the fact that I have relied on a number of independent sources, there may be minor discrepancies between the individual figures, sum totals, and percentages listed. Nonetheless, they are all close, and do not differ significantly from statistics found in the existing literature.

Table 1 Jewish Victimization Statistics for the German Sphere of Influence

| Country | Pre-Final Solution Jewish Population | Jews Deported and/or Killed | Victimization Rate (%) |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| The Baltic States | 291,000 | 279,936 | 96.2 |
| Poland | 3,300,000 | 3,000,000 | 90.9 |
| Germany (including Austria) | 240,000 | 210,000 | 87.5 |
| Luxembourg | 796 | 674 | 84.7 |
| Greece | 68,000 | 56,685 | 83.4 |
| Hungary | 825,007 | 681,007 | 82.5 |
| Until March 19, 1944 | 825,007 | 63,000 | 7.6 |
| After March 19, 1944 | 762,007 | 618,007 | 81.1 |
| Czechoslovakia | 179,851 | 146,400 | 81.4 |
| Protectorate | 90,847 | 75,205 | 82.8 |
| Slovakia | 88,951 | 71,300 | 80.0 |
| Yugoslavia | 56,000 | 45,000 | 80.4* |
| Croatia | 40,000 | 30,000 | 75.0* |
| Serbia | 16,000 | 14,750 | 92.2* |
| Netherlands | 159,806 | 107,000 | 67.0 |
| Belgium | 65,696 | 34,801 | 53.0 |
| Romania | 557,313 | 285,505 | 51.2 |
| Norway | 1700 | 786 | 46.2 |
| France | 310,000 | 79,721 | 25.7 |
| Italy | 43,118 | 7,800 | 18.1 |
| Bulgaria | 63,403 | 11,393 | 18.0 |
| Denmark | 7,851 | 477 | 6.1 |
| Until August 29, 1943 | | | 0.0 |
| After August 29, 1943 | | | 6.1 |
| Finland | 2000 | 8 | 0.4 |

* Death rates.

On the face of it, the most striking aspect of the chart is simply the *degree* of variation demonstrated among countries under German domination. This fact alone brings us to question a tacit assumption sometimes made in the discussion of totalitarian regimes. Contrary to common belief, the Nazi regime — in some respects, the very *definition* of a totalitarian regime — was subject to considerable limitations in the implementation of its anti-Jewish policy. Not only did two countries succeed in protecting nearly *all* of their Jewish citizens; a full third of them finished the war having lost ‘only’ a quarter of their Jewish populations. Indeed, it was only in a small fraction of the administrative units that the destruction was what we could call “complete” in general terms. In fact, most of the countries seem to fall somewhere in the middle — losing between 50% to just over 80% over their pre-war Jewish populations. Contrary to the common image of a Europe ‘under the thumb’ of imperial domination, the Nazi regime itself was clearly subject to some very real constraints. The purpose of this project is to investigate further the nature and causes of these constraints.

A glance at the chart also serves to challenge a number of tacitly held assumptions about the causes of victimization rate variation. For example, though precise levels of antisemitism are difficult to establish, the figures on the chart do not even coincide with our general impressions of this potential factor: The Netherlands, with its high victimization rate, was arguably the least antisemitic country in all of Europe. Romania and France, on the other hand, demonstrate markedly lower rates of Jewish victimization despite being more antisemitic by most reasonable standards. Likewise, there also seems to be no correlation between the absolute number of Jews in a given country and the percentage victimized. Norway, with its tiny Jewish population, lost about the same percentage of its Jews as did Belgium and Romania, even though their initial Jewish populations were much larger. Meanwhile, Bulgaria, Belgium, Greece, and Latvia each had between sixty and seventy thousand Jews when the Final Solution was first put into effect, even though these countries demonstrate a huge range in rates of Jewish victimization. Clearly, even if we were to establish that these factors (antisemitism or Jewish population) had *some* effect on rates of Jewish victimization, the finding would be incomplete, and we would be forced to search for either (1) other independent factors or (2) a more general, contextual variable that explains why antisemitism and absolute size would have salience in certain cases and not in others.

By way of disclaimer, it should be mentioned that a low victimization rate for a given country does *not* imply that the country was somehow ‘morally superior’ to countries where Jewish victimization was, for whatever reason, more complete. Jews in countries with low victimization

rates only survived because their leaders were allied or collaborating with Nazi Germany, and thus (indirectly) prolonging the suffering of Jewish people elsewhere on the continent. Jews in the Netherlands and Norway came face-to-face with the full brutality of Nazi tyranny precisely because their elected leaders, unlike those in France and Denmark, refused to cooperate with Nazi Germany in the first place. Jews in Hungary were largely spared only so long as their country remained a faithful German ally; when Hungary's leaders threatened to leave the Axis alliance (in March 1944), Germany imposed direct rule on the country and its Jews were thoroughly victimized despite the fact that the war was almost over.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that, even in cases where collaborators protected local Jews, they did not necessarily do so for the 'right reasons' or as the result of some sort of well-articulated plan. Romania's antisemitic leadership infamously extorted local Jews, extracting bribes, subjecting Jews to exploitative taxation, or using them as slave labor in the country's thriving armaments industry. Despite these hardships (and maybe even *because* of them), Romania's persecuted Jewish citizens were nonetheless largely spared the fate of being sent to German extermination camps. In a policy even more xenophobic than antisemitic, collaborators in Vichy France ruthlessly (albeit not consistently) focused their energies on rounding-up and deporting foreign Jews while procrastinating on the more controversial and politically difficult task of attacking Jews who were French citizens. Though they were often antisemitic, collaborating leaders often lacked the Nazis' 'enthusiasm' for addressing the Jewish Question. Indeed, one of the surprising and fascinating lessons of this project is that, despite the availability of willing collaborators, the German genocidal apparatus, like any bureaucracy, constantly faced problems of agency loss and inefficiency in the implementation of its evil designs.

The costs and benefits of indirect rule.

Like any regime at war, Germany had to consider the relative costs and benefits of direct, occupational rule. Aside from securing a border from Allied attack, Germany had to consider the sometimes immense costs of fighting partisans, instituting and enforcing local law, not to mention the more typical costs of governmental administration. These costs might indeed be prohibitive in countries where home-rule was a long-standing and established tradition. Where possible, Germany certainly had the incentive to leave the costs of governance to local officials — even if this required that Germany sacrifice its ability to carry out genocidal policies effectively.

In its treatment of foreign governments, Germany seems to have been guided primarily by military and economic concerns. For instance, Germany explicitly bargained with Bulgaria and

Romania — accepting Jews from their newly acquired territories while relinquishing its demands on the Jews in Bulgaria and Romania proper. No doubt, Germany's reliance on these countries in terms of military assistance tied its hands in terms of the intensity with which it could make racially-motivated demands. All other things being equal, Germany certainly preferred the efficient and unhindered implementation of anti-Jewish policy. However, observation shows that Germany was usually not willing to sacrifice an ally or faithful collaborator in order to achieve that aim.*

Clearly, Germany had the incentive to rule through collaborators — thereby exporting the costs of governance to local officials. And in return for their local autonomy, collaborators were usually willing to 'pay' Germany by providing faithful cooperation. However, with regard to some specific issues (including the Jewish Question), Germany could not push these collaborators too far — lest it jeopardize their continued support in other (more important) aspects of the ongoing military operation. The resulting dynamic left considerable room for local officials to negotiate with Germany on behalf of local Jews. With promises (and even deliveries) of continued military and economic support, domestic rulers could often win security guarantees for their Jewish constituents.

Looking at this from the point of view of the collaborators, however, the implication is that occupied countries could actually preserve a fair degree of autonomy simply by collaborating with Germany on policy issues that had little or nothing to do with the genocide program. Consider, for example, the actions of a regime whose very name has become synonymous with the evils of collaboration: Vichy France. While Vichy officials were certainly willing to subject French Jews to antisemitic legislation, and while they were also willing to participate in the arrest and deportation of Jews who lacked French citizenship, the Vichy regime was significantly more hesitant about participating in the deportation of French Jews. Routinely, foreign Jews living in France were deported, while Jews who were French citizens remained unharmed — at least for the initial stages of the deportations. This 'resistance' — though hardly heroic and tragically bigoted in its own right — was a constant headache for German occupational officials, and no doubt contributed to the fact that over three-quarters of the Jews in that country survived the war. In his own defense after the war, Vichy collaborator Henri-Philippe Pétain said to the French people: "If I could not be your sword, at least I would be your shield." Of course, Pétain was hardly concerned with the well being of French Jews as Jews. But the chauvinistic nationalism in France at the time was simply such

* As a point of contrast, note that Germany only explicitly revoked Hungarian independence when it suspected that country's lack of *military* allegiance. The decision had disastrous consequences for Hungary's Jews — who had been largely untouched before 1944. As already noted, the late start of deportations in Hungary did not hinder the German effort to decimate the country's Jewish population.

that deporting French citizens was politically dangerous, regardless of the religious affiliation of the deportees. It is not so much that Vichy officials aimed to protect French Jews as part of a well-articulated plan, but rather that they lacked the political will to victimize them with anything near the zeal of their Nazi sponsors.

Similar stories of partial cooperation, shirking, and foot-dragging can be told of collaborationist countries and German allies around the continent. In April 1941, Bulgaria lent its hand to the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece. In return for their cooperation in this endeavor, King Boris and his government were allowed to remain in office and actually rewarded with the captured Yugoslav and Greek territories of Macedonia and Greece. In February 1943, Germany and Bulgaria actually signed an agreement regarding the deportation of Jews from these recently conquered territories. Ultimately, 11,400 Jews from Bulgaria's acquired territories were deported and killed. However, this number represented a certain amount of shirking on the part of the Bulgarians because it fell short of the roughly 20,000 Jews referred to in the agreement. Moreover, by agreeing to deport only these *foreign* Jews, Bulgarian officials actually succeeded in protecting the nearly 50,000 Jews who lived in Bulgaria-proper. All told, over 80% of Bulgarian Jews survived the war. Like Bulgaria, Romania joined in the German war effort, and came to control new swaths of territory for her efforts. In so doing, however, Atonescu, like his Bulgarian counterpart, was able to strike a 'dirty deal' with the Germans — whereby the Jews in the newly conquered territories were essentially sold-out in return for delays regarding the deportation of Jewish people from Romania itself. Like many ruthless antisemites, Atonescu later found a way to turn his 'heroic' protection of Romania's Jews into a profit: Jews in Romania were soon forced to pay higher taxes than their fellow citizens. With this 'Jew tax' in full force, Atonescu steadily became only more interested in protecting 'his' Jews from German persecution.*

Even in countries that did not benefit *territorially* from cooperation with the Germans, other bases of compromise could be found. In Italy, Germany's closest and most reliable ally, Benito Mussolini eventually bowed to German pressure to introduce anti-Jewish legislation.† But Mussolini was sure to exempt certain categories of Jews from the laws' effect — among them, Jewish converts to Catholicism, war veterans, and members of the Fascist Party. By demonstrating his concern for members of these three most important institutions, Mussolini was simultaneously able to consolidate his control over wartime Italy and to assert his authority and autonomy from his

* For a more detailed account of the final solution in Bulgaria and Romania, please see Ethan J. Hollander's "The Final Solution in Bulgaria and Romania: A Comparative Perspective" (as found in *East European Politics and Societies*. Vol. 22: No. 2 (Spring 2008): pp. 203-248).

† Mussolini called this legislation a "showy but cheap token payment" to his fellow Axis power [Levin 1990: 299].

German sponsors. Ultimately, Jews were only deported from Italy in significant numbers *after* a coup removed Mussolini from power.

Why protect local Jews?

But why would domestic officials and collaborators expend valuable political capital or risk their positions in office for the sake of local Jews? While specific answers to this question are to be found in the unique political dynamics of each country's encounter with the Final Solution, a number of general factors arise as important contributors to Jewish survival in Germany's sphere of influence.

First, there is the sheer magnitude of the German program: While antisemites around Europe may have been content to see their Jews resettled elsewhere, they were somewhat less willing to become accomplices in mass murder — especially of those who had long been considered *citizens* (albeit, persecuted ones) of the country in question. Inherent in these hesitations is an enduring political reality: Like Germany, collaborators, too, were subject to the powerful forces of political expediency. Even though they certainly did not rely upon the same kind of broad popular support as the elected leadership of a contemporary democracy, collaborators still had to balance German demands with the needs and desires of at least a selected constituency. So, when that constituency was hostile to the idea of deporting citizens (Jewish, socialist, or otherwise) to Nazi death camps, collaborators faced a terrifying and potentially career-threatening dilemma: Ignore German demands, and thereby risk being thrown out of office, or acquiesce to them, and risk the same fate at the hands of the collaborator's own citizens. It is no wonder, then, that collaborators often tried to find a compromise: Implement German racial policy, but with enough hesitancy — or enough loopholes — to satisfy domestic audiences. Only in Germany, where anti-Jewish propaganda had worked its toll for nearly a generation, were protests relatively (though not completely) non-existent. Obviously, factors such as these would become only more salient as the war progressed, rumors spread, and the true meaning of words like 'resettlement' became known.

Over the course of the war, many collaborators also seemed eager to distance themselves from the Nazi regime. After all, the sort of nationalism engendered by fascism has historically torn empires apart, not held them together. Thus, if only to signal a certain degree of autonomy from German pressure, or to underscore the 'sanctity' and sincerity of (domestic) 'racial purity', collaborators often sought to put their own 'stamp' on antisemitic policies. Ironically, these 'self-imposed' anti-Jewish measures often had the effect of protecting the very Jews they were intended

to harm. Sometimes, where collaborators had the authority to persecute local Jews, German officials *lacked* the authority to deport them. There is no small irony in the notion that, while liberalism and socialism had both largely failed the Jewish people of Europe, nationalism was sometimes the most potent force protecting them from Nazi tyranny.

Finally, collaborators who refused to negotiate on behalf of their Jews gave up a potentially profitable opportunity to exploit them. All over collaborationist Europe, high-ranking domestic officials sacrificed local Jews for the satisfaction of their political and financial motives. In some cases, collaborators protected Jews to placate domestic constituencies or to assert their autonomy from German sponsors. In others, they ruthlessly exploited the targets of Nazi persecution for their ability to pay political or even financial rewards – as rampant bribery and ‘Jew-taxes’ in places like Romania and Hungary attest. But exploiting a Jewish population usually entailed protecting that population from deportation, if only to keep it in the country, working in local factories and paying off local officials. Ironically, some Jewish people survived the Holocaust not despite the antisemitism of their political leaders, but because of it.

Discussions of Jewish survival in collaborating countries inevitably turn to the degree to which Jewish survival was the result of a well-articulated plan on the part of the collaborators. While high-ranking domestic officials certainly *sometimes* intended to protect segments of a local population, their efforts were usually not comprehensive, nor were they necessarily inspired by genuine concern for the populations in question. By examining the issue of collaborator protection of Jews in comparative perspective, however, I believe I have found a way to situate their actions in the context of the intentionalist-functionalist debate, a long-established framework for understanding the formulation of the final solution in Nazi Germany. With this general framework for understanding collaborationist regimes, their actions, incentives and intentions, future research can determine the degree to which collaborators were motivated by a conscious and intentional effort to protect local Jews, or whether Jews survived as an ‘unintentional byproduct’ of local autonomy and indirect German rule. My intention, of course, is not to provide a conclusive answer to this debate, but rather to invite future research to investigate the issue within the framework provided in this study.

Conclusion.

Nazi Germany was certainly exceptional for the sheer brutality and totalitarian nature of its rule. The Holocaust was unique among genocides for its bureaucratic organization and the ‘rationality’ of its process, if not its inspiration. But rather than seeing these features of the case as things that

make comparison impossible, I have accepted them as invitations. I have not assumed that the Holocaust was too complex or too horrible to be subjected to rational or comparative analysis; rather, I have recognized that, as such an important and horrible event, we do ourselves a disservice if we do not use all of the means and methods at our disposal to understand it. It is only by understanding the generalities rather than the particulars of such an event that we stand any chance of avoiding things like it in the future.

As the study of the process by which individual interests are reconciled with government action, political science is uniquely suited for analyzing the institutional planning and bureaucratic implementation of the Nazi genocide. In some respects, those very features which make the Holocaust unique (the totalitarian nature of the regime; the bureaucratic rationalization of the process) also make it particularly interesting for those schooled in the process by which political policies are formulated. The fact that few regimes have replicated the totality of Nazi Germany's authoritarian rule does not mean that we are without tools to study that regime; rather, it makes the fact that even Nazi policy was sometimes sabotaged more interesting. However horrible, the Final Solution was a political policy, perpetrated by a regime that was largely capable of implementing its evil designs. It is therefore all the more surprising that the policy was so 'unsuccessful' in so many places it was applied. If *Nazi* policy was subject to inefficiency, compromise, and structural limitations, how much *more* so must this be the case for more ordinary policies implemented by less dictatorial regimes?

The sheer magnitude of the Holocaust is such that our failure, as political scientists, to address it is hardly surprising. But, in so doing, our discipline has failed to realize its greatest potential and shied away from some of the world's greatest contemporary challenges. In a world where ethnic conflict, state-sponsored violence and ideological fanaticism have again come to dominate our political lives, and where advances in the machinery of destruction have long outpaced our ability to coexist, continued silence on such issues is not only puzzling, but morally disturbing. This project begins of process of correcting for this deficiency.